

1 Friday, 5 July, 1946

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3 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
4 FOR THE FAR EAST
5 Court House of the Tribunal
6 War Ministry Building
7 Tokyo, Japan

8 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9 at 0930.

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11 Appearances:

12 For the Tribunal, same as before with the
13 exception of HON. DELFIN JARANILLA, Justice, Member
14 from the Commonwealth of the Philippines, who is not
15 sitting.

16 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

17 For the Defense Section, same as before.

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20 (English to Japanese and Japanese
21 to English interpretation was made by
22 SHIMANOUCI, Toshiro and SHIMADA, Masakazu,
23 Sho Onodera acting as Monitor.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is in session
3 and is ready to hear any matter brought before it.

4 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
5 except OKAWA and, I understand, HIRANUMA. I have
6 been informed by the Marshal that HIRANUMA is too
7 ill to attend. But we have no doctor's certificate;
8 we should have one. It should be the certificate
9 of the Sugamo Prison's doctor.

10 MR. OHTA: I am OHTA, counsel for the
11 defendant DOHIMARA. I should like to put two or
12 three questions on subjects which were overlooked
13 at our previous session.
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1 K E I S U K E O K A D A, called as a witness
2 on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand
3 and testified as follows:

4 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

5 BY MR. OHTA:

6 Q Mr. Witness, in your affidavit you refer to
7 the incident of Lieutenant Colonel AIZAWA, and you
8 state that despite your status as Prime Minister you
9 were powerless to conduct the investigation of said
10 incident. The fact is, however, that in less than a
11 year after the hearing on the case, sentence was pro-
12 nounced on the third of July, 1936.

13 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: You stated
14 in your affidavit that despite the fact that you were
15 Prime Minister at the time, you were powerless to inves-
16 tigate the crime committed by a mere officer in the
17 army. However, do you not confirm the fact that
18 Lieutenant Colonel AIZAWA was indicted in less than a
19 year, and on July 3, 1936, he was executed?

20 MR. DARSEY: Mr. President, I would like to
21 direct the Court's attention to the fact that this
22 counsel has conducted cross-examination on one occa-
23 sion previously.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Is this not a continuation?
25 You say this is his second attempt to cross-examine?

OKADA

CROSS

1 MR. DARSEY: He concluded his previous cross-
2 examination.

3 THE PRESIDENT: I was not aware of that. You
4 cannot cross-examine further.

5 MR. HOZUMI: I am HOZUMI, counsel for the
6 defendant TOGO.

7 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

8 BY MR. HOZUMI:

9 Q Mr. Witness, may I ask you whether you recall
10 the fact that a preliminary conference on naval disar-
11 mament was held in London in 1934 when you were Prime
12 Minister?

13 A Yes, I recall that fact.

14 Q There is no mistake in my statement then
15 that at that conference the Japanese navy proposed
16 as its counter-plan the principle of the common upper
17 limit in naval tonnage?

18 A Yes, you are correct.

19 Q Do you also remember the fact that TOGO at
20 that time was director of the European-Asiatic Affairs
21 Bureau of the Foreign Office?

22 A Yes, I remember.

23 Q Do you also know of the fact that TOGO, direc-
24 tor of this bureau, had an opposing opinion to the
25 principle of the common upper limit in naval tonnage

OKADA

CROSS

1 on the ground that such a plan would obstruct the suc-
2 cess of the conference?

3 A No, I am not aware of that fact.

4 Q What is your recollection of the fact that
5 TOGO at that time had expressed his opposing opinion
6 to the Prime Minister on the subject?

7 A I don't recall that.

8 Q Do you recall the fact that in the same year
9 the Washington Naval Treaty was renounced?

10 A Yes, I recall that.

11 Q Then, what about the fact that TOGO was also
12 opposed to the abrogation of this Washington Treaty?

13 A I don't recall that.

14 Q Then, what was the opinion of the Prime Min-
15 ister himself?

16 A I was under the impression that the idea of
17 fixing the common upper limit would be approved at
18 least by the United States of America.

19 THE MONITOR: If explained well to them.

20 Q What was the result of that?

21 A The result was not satisfactory.

22 Q Could you, Mr. Witness, explain in concrete
23 terms the contents of your knowledge of the plot for
24 the Manchurian Incident when you were Navy Minister
25 in the SAITO Cabinet?

OKADA

CROSS

1 A I knew that it was carried out by several of
2 the younger officers of the Kwantung Army.

3 Q My question, Mr. Witness, is not the plot
4 itself but the process by which you acquired knowledge
5 of this plot.

6 A I came to understand fully about that matter
7 on the strength of an investigation, as the result
8 of an investigation carried out by the government in
9 the previous year.

10 THE MONITOR: Correction: The government car-
11 ried out the investigation the following year about the
12 incident that occurred the previous year. Therefore,
13 I learned about this.

14 MR. DARSEY: There is no redirect, Mr. Presi-
15 dent.

16 (Whereupon, the witness was excused)

17 MR. DARSEY: May Mr. Sackett proceed with the
18 further production of evidence?
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20 MR. SACKETT: May it please the Court, the
21 prosecution would like to have its document 490 marked
22 for identification. It is already in the hands of
23 the Clerk, having been deposited there pursuant to
24 an order of this Court.

25 CLERK OF THE COURT: It will be marked
exhibit No. 177.

1 (Whereupon, the document above
2 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
3 No. 177 for identification.)

4 MR. SACKETT: I might say that this is a
5 book written by HASHIMOTO in 1940, the accused
6 HASHIMOTO. The prosecution does not desire to offer
7 in evidence the entire book, but merely an excerpt
8 from pages two, three and four.

9 I have spoken to the Clerk, and in view of
10 the fact that there may be other excerpts introduced
11 in the future and I have before me an exact copy in
12 Japanese and English of the excerpt we desire to intro-
13 duce. I suggest that it also be marked an exhibit for
14 identification so that the record may be clear as to
15 what we are offering. I will make an offer next.

16 THE PRESIDENT: It will have to be formally
17 tendered.

18 MR. SACKETT: I am going to make the offer
19 now, if it please your Honor.

20 The prosecution now offers in evidence the
21 excerpt from prosecution's document 490, which is
22 marked 490B. We offer to prove by this excerpt, if
23 the Court please, that the accused HASHIMOTO in 1930
24 actively planned the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese
25 secession from the League of Nations, the Japanese

1 renunciation of the disarmament treaty, together with
2 various incidents that occurred in Japan proper.

3 MR. McMANUS: If the Tribunal pleases, I
4 would like to have my objection noted to any further
5 explanation by the prosecutor. After all there has
6 been an opening statement here, and the documents are
7 being offered. I do not see that the prosecutor should
8 testify himself with an additional opening statement
9 and an additional explanation.

10 THE PRESIDENT: He merely described the con-
11 tents of the excerpt. That is all it amounted to; in
12 very few words, too.

13 The document is admitted subject to the usual
14 terms.

15 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit No.
16 177 was received in evidence.)

17 MR. SACKETT: The prosecution would like to
18 read the excerpt, if the Court please.

19 Book by HASHIMOTO, "The Road to the Recon-
20 struction of the World."

21 Caption: "Advice to Young People. Pulsation
22 of the Nations."

23 "Since graduating from the Military Staff
24 College, I have been immersed in my study of revolu-
25 tionary Russia in the Russian Section of the General

1 Staff Office. In 1927, I unexpectedly was appointed
2 attache to the Turkish Embassy by official order and
3 frequently had intimate talks with the dictator
4 Kemal, having had dinner with him in Angora, Capital
5 of Turkey. After my three years' stay in Europe, I
6 returned to my native country in 1930.

7 "During my stay in Europe, when I observed
8 the politics of Stalin of Soviet Russia, Mussolini
9 of Italy, Hitler of Germany, and Riza Khan of Persia,
10 which were the main objects of my study, and to say
11 nothing of Kemal in my appointed country, I keenly
12 felt that these countries were moving strongly
13 toward government control with unanimous consent,
14 although it was not clear what they would demand
15 or although the source was not the same."

16 Caption: "I entertain fears for my native
17 country."

18 "When I observed Japan through the Japanese
19 papers, studying the tendency and actual conditions
20 of these countries and being impressed by the above
21 mentioned emotion, during my three years' stay in
22 Europe, I was clearly conscious that Japan was the
23 only country within the whirlpool of world movement
24 that stood within the bounds of liberalism and re-
25 garded liberalism as the one and best ideal. I con-

1 sidered that if Japan goes on under the present con-
2 ditions, she would drop from the ranks in the com-
3 munity of nations and cause the downfall of Japan.
4 I thought it was not then time for me to stay non-
5 chalantly overseas but to return as soon as possible
6 and to do something about it.

7 "At this time, fortunately, I was ordered
8 to go back and with an irresistible longing for home,
9 sailed across the Indian Ocean toward my fatherland
10 in an easterly direction. During my thirty days'
11 voyage, I pondered on how to reform Japan and as
12 the result, I succeeded in drawing a definite plan
13 to a certain degree. And on returning to the General
14 Staff Office, my former haunt, I devised several
15 schemes in order to put my ideas into execution.
16 Although I dare not say it was the only cause of
17 such results, however, the Manchurian Incident,
18 secession from the League of Nations, and renun-
19 ciation of the disarmament treaty took place suc-
20 cessively and within the country, May 15 Incident,
21 SHINPEI TAI Incident, and the February 26 Incident
22 took place in succession."
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1 The prosecution at this time would like to---
2 they had copies, I understood, your Honor. We checked
3 the other day.

4 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: Our copies do not
5 contain the first part of your statement at all.

6 MR. SACKETT: Well, I checked with you on
7 your exhibits and you said you had them.

8 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: We have document 490.
9 It is not contained in those pages, that matter.

10 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, the prose-
11 cution at this time would like to offer the diary of
12 Marquis KIDO, the accused Marquis KIDO, for identifi-
13 cation.

14 CLERK OF THE COURT: How would you like to
15 have this marked?

16 MR. SACKETT: I would like to have it marked
17 as an exhibit.

18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Do you want separate
19 letters for each of the volumes? The next number will
20 be 178. Do you want it A, B, C, D, and so forth?

21 MR. SACKETT: I think the diary should be
22 marked for identification with one exhibit number at
23 the moment.

24 (Whereupon, the document above
25 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit

1 No. 178 for identification.)

2 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, the defense
3 objects to the offer of the entire diary. The entire
4 diary has not been served on us for translation for
5 all defense counsel. We understand that, under the
6 rule as amended, only excerpts can be offered and
7 only excerpts go into evidence.

8 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, there has
9 been no offer made as yet.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Sackett, we expect you
11 to exercise a little more formality. You should have
12 told Mr. Furness you had not finished what you had to
13 say.

14 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, the prose-
15 cution at this time does not desire to offer the
16 entire diary in evidence. It has been merely marked
17 for identification. We desire to offer in evidence
18 eighteen separate excerpts during the months of July,
19 August, September and October, 1931. The excerpts
20 have been circulated to the defendants. I have copies
21 of the Japanese and English here. For the sake of
22 keeping the record straight, and in view of the fact
23 there may be other offers in the future from other
24 sections, I think that these separate excerpts should
25 be marked for identification as separate exhibit .

1 numbers.

2 The prosecution at this time would like to
3 offer in evidence --

4 MR. FURNESS: Do I understand that the entire
5 diary is later to be offered in evidence? If not,
6 I see no reason for having it marked for identifica-
7 tion or given an exhibit number. If it is to be
8 offered in its entirety, the defense is very much
9 interested and would like to know.

10 MR. SACKETT: The prosecution, if the Court
11 please, reserves the right to offer such evidence as
12 it sees fit, and the defense may do accordingly. It
13 will be all excerpts.

14 THE PRESIDENT: At present you are offering
15 excerpts.

16 MR. SACKETT: We are offering excerpts only.
17 That is the offer.

18 THE PRESIDENT: They are admitted on the
19 usual terms.

20 MR. FURNESS: May I ask against whom these
21 excerpts are being offered? Only against KIDO or
22 against all defendants?

23 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, the ex-
24 cerpts are being offered against all defendants under
25 the terms of the Charter that says a diary is

1 admissible in evidence.

2 MR. FURNESS: Then, as to the defendant
3 SHIGEMITSU, and as to the defendant UMEZU, I am author-
4 ized to object on the grounds that conspiracy has not
5 been proved, on the relevancy and competency and
6 materiality of these excerpts as evidence.

7 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, we charge
8 conspiracy among all defendants. We offer to connect
9 all the defendants with the conspiracy in the course
10 of this trial. And we offer these statements in the
11 diary of Marquis KIDO in evidence as a statement of
12 co-conspirator made in the course of conspiracy. We
13 offer them with the understanding that the other
14 defendants will be connected up with the conspiracy.

15 THE PRESIDENT: The Court will consider the
16 objections.
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1 MR. FURNESS: Will the Court make a ruling
2 on that, if your Honor please?

3 THE PRESIDENT: I will have to ask the Court
4 to adjourn to consider this if you want a ruling now.
5 I don't think that we should be required to do that,
6 actually. These documents are submitted subject to
7 the usual terms. That is the expression. The terms
8 will be subject to all just exceptions that are
9 taken. Exception is now taken on specified grounds.
10 Those exceptions will be considered.

11 MR. SACKETT: In order that the Court may
12 know the relevancy of this offer, I would like to state
13 that we offer to prove by these excerpts the great
14 increase in the power of the Japanese Army between
15 July and October 1931 which is the period of time
16 prior to and subsequent to the Manchurian Incident,
17 September 18.

18 THE MONITOR: Will the reporter please read
19 that last statement?

20 (Whereupon, the last statement
21 was read by the official court reporter.)

22 MR. SACKETT: First excerpt is that of
23 July 11, 1931 and is prosecution's document 1632-A --
24 "On the way home about 10 o'clock, I visited Mr.
25 HARADA at his home. Heard the information that the

1 Army during the past week had stiffened its attitude
2 in regard to the reduction of the armaments and
3 especially in regards to economizing which is the
4 latest plan of the Finance Department. We are
5 worried that the Army as a last resort might take
6 further steps to appeal to the throne."

7 The next excerpt --

8 THE PRESIDENT: I understand that all these
9 excerpts will have one exhibit number but that each
10 excerpt would have a letter in addition. Is that
11 what you have in mind?

12 CLERK OF THE COURT: The first excerpt is
13 from exhibit 179-A, and the rest are numbered B
14 down to R.

15 (Whereupon, the documents above
16 referred to were marked prosecution's exhibit
17 No. 179-A to 179-R for identification.)

18 MR. SACKETT: May I hand them all in and
19 then read without interruption?

20 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. They are admitted
21 subject to the usual terms.

22 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit
23 No. 179-A to 179-R were received in evidence.)

24 MR. SACKETT: 1632-B: "July 13, Monday --
25 At noon, had lunch with Messrs. HARADA, TAGAKI,

1 SAKAI and OKABE at Tokyo Club. Mr. HARADA reported
2 to us that the Army was more unyielding than ever
3 and that the War Minister is going to see the
4 Emperor on the 14th or 15th. I thought that I
5 should report this matter to the Lord Keeper of the
6 Privy Seal, and left Shinbashi at 2:25 for Kamakura
7 to relay this message. Ordered to relay this message
8 to the Grand Chamberlain in Hayama, I immediately
9 left by automobile and called on the Grand Chamber-
10 lain SUZUKI at Chojaen. I relayed to him the message
11 and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's view in re-
12 gard to it and came home at 6:30."

13 August 7, Friday -- "Came to Tokyo by
14 electric car starting at 8:19 and went to see Mr.
15 HARADA. I learned about the latest political condi-
16 tions and especially of the plot to be carried out in
17 Army circles during the middle of March. It is
18 regrettable from the standpoint of control of our
19 country that it is becoming very obvious that the
20 Army will carry out a certain type of plot.

21 "During the middle of March when the
22 Parliamentary session was being held a plan was
23 drafted at the official residence of War Minister to
24 disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about
25 the political change by Major Generals KOISO,

1 TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA as leaders with Lieutenant
2 Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI who would act at
3 their beck and call. OKAWA, Shumei, stood between
4 them collaborating with Social Mass Party. They
5 planned to send Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI to MORI
6 of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot con-
7 fidentially. This was given up, however, by the
8 advice of SUZUKI, who (entertained fears) for the
9 sake of the Army. It could be guessed that UGAKI
10 was at the back of the plot.

11 "An association of research group of
12 Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among
13 a group of captains graduated recently from the Army
14 Staff College, and the above-mentioned Lieutenant
15 Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI were its backers.

16 "The brains of the Army cannot check these
17 kind of associations because they themselves planned
18 such plots as mentioned above.

19 "Recently the Army group has been getting
20 very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism
21 between the civilians and the Army regarding draft-
22 ing of the budget.

23 THE PRESIDENT: We have not been given the
24 right excerpts. This is getting out of hand, Mr.
25 Sackett.

1 MR. SACKETT: I beg your pardon?

2 THE PRESIDENT: You had better hand each
3 of the judges the whole thirty excerpts at the same
4 time. You are saying one thing, and we are reading
5 another.

6 MR. SACKETT: My information is, if the
7 Court please, these copies were handed in in the
8 order in which I am reading. There are fifteen
9 copies of eighteen excerpts.

10 THE PRESIDENT: The fact is that we are
11 reading one thing, and you are stating another.

12 MR. SACKETT: I might say this to help
13 clarify the situation: that the alphabetical letter-
14 ing on the prosecution's documents is not being fol-
15 lowed. That was a matter merely of processing. I
16 am following them chronologically and stating the
17 date -- in other words, A, then B, then G, and then
18 I. But I am reading them chronologically, giving the
19 dates first, and they are handed in in the order in
20 which I am reading them, which is a chronological
21 order.

22 THE PRESIDENT: I repeat, you are saying one
23 thing, and we are reading another. What the explan-
24 ation is, I am not concerned to discover just now.
25 But I want these things in proper order.

1 MR. SACKETT: May I proceed, your Honor?

2 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if you are ready.

3 MR. LOGAN: May I have a ruling at this
4 time by the Tribunal so I will be guided in the
5 future with respect to the reading of excerpts from
6 this diary? I don't want to interrupt and try to
7 make corrections every time an excerpt is read
8 because of the difference in the translation. And
9 I would like to have a ruling from the Tribunal as
10 to whether I should make those objections at the
11 time the excerpts are read or wait until the entire
12 diary is completed and then submit our translation.

13 Now, for example, this excerpt that was
14 just read a minute ago - August 7, document 1632-G -
15 that's the one where it refers to a plot in the
16 future during the next March, when the actual trans-
17 lation of the document refers to an incident that
18 happened the previous March; and it changes the
19 entire sense of the balance of the excerpt.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Your position will not be
21 prejudiced if you defer your objection to the extent
22 that you propose.

23 MR. SACKETT: The next entry, if the Court
24 please, is marked 1632-H. It is dated August 12,
25 1931.

1 "6 o'clock in the afternoon, I went to
2 Baron HARADA's house. Had dinner with Prince KONOYE
3 and Marquis INOUE. We heard and studied the de-
4 tails of what Mr. HARADA had told me the other day
5 about the under-handed activities of a section of
6 the Army. The affair that made Mr. UGAKI the
7 leader, was that of March 20. Certain SHIMIZU of
8 Taikosha was supplied with thirty bombs (Those were
9 only for use in maneuvers and were almost harmless).
10 However, it was told that the bombs were taken back
11 to the Army a month ago. It is a fact that because
12 the plot was called off and to pay off the men that
13 had been assembled, they collected ¥ 100,000 from
14 among the Tokugawa nobles."

15 There is a footnote which I shall read:
16 "The above-mentioned fact centering around Ugaki as
17 the leader, is in regard to the occurrence of about
18 March 20, when a certain --" doesn't finish.

19 CAPTAIN KLEIMAN: May I address the
20 Tribunal?

21 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

22 CAPTAIN KLEIMAN: Since five weeks ago,
23 I have asked the prosecution to allow me to inspect
24 the diary either in Japanese or English translation
25 so that we could become acquainted with the same.

1 I make the request through the Secretariat's office.
2 The Secretariat has been trying to cooperate with me.
3 I received notes from them on two occasions to go up
4 to the prosecution's office. As yet, I have not seen
5 the diary.

6 I now request, on behalf of the defendant
7 HIRANUMA, for myself to be allowed to take those
8 books in Japanese so that my Japanese associate may
9 look over those books. I will return them in the
10 same condition by Monday morning.

11 THE PRESIDENT: No, you cannot have those
12 books. You know you cannot have them.

13 (To the interpreter) Interpret what he
14 said.

15 (To Captain Kleiman) You must know,
16 Captain Kleiman, the originals must remain in the
17 possession of the Court, but you must be given every
18 facility to inspect them in your turn. Others may
19 be entitled to precede you.

20 The order made by the Court covers this
21 matter.

22 CAPTAIN KLEIMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
23 I don't know what is contained in the diary. At
24 this time, on behalf of the defendant HIRANUMA, I
25 offer in evidence the entire contents of the diary

1 and ask for translation to be made in behalf of the
2 defendant HIRANUMA by the prosecution who has the
3 only translation staff. We have no one to make any
4 translations.

5 THE PRESIDENT: You have no right to tender
6 that evidence in this stage unless the prosecution
7 invites you, or the Court. Neither have done so.

8 DR. KIYOSE: This evidence was originally
9 written in Japanese, and the Japanese version should
10 be the original of it.

11 THE MONITOR: Or, should be the standard
12 by which this trial should proceed.

13 DR. KIYOSE (Continuing): The Japanese
14 counsel are somewhat confused in that, although this
15 document is called a diary, many passages therein
16 are undated. That being the case, we should like
17 to have this matter submitted to the Language
18 Section of the Tribunal for necessary corrections.

19 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, at the
20 present time --

21 THE PRESIDENT: You are always permitted to
22 refer matters to the Language Section. There is no
23 need to interrupt these proceedings to ask for some-
24 thing you are already entitled to.

25 Go ahead.

1 DR. KIYOSE: I am not impeding this trial;
2 I am trying to help it out.

3 THE PRESIDENT: You are impeding it when
4 you make unnecessary requests.

5 MR. SACKETT: The next document is
6 numbered 1632-D, dated September 9, 1931, Wednesday.

7 "At 6:30 P.M., held a conference in re-
8 spect of the present aspect of affairs, at the resi-
9 dence of Prince KONOYE, including the prince, ARIMA,
10 OKABE and myself. Mostly, ARIMA explained in de-
11 tails about the secret plot which had been planned
12 by a certain group of militarists and the OKAWA's
13 faction in the middle part of last March, by such
14 connection as he had been requested to participate
15 in executive the plot by OKAWA, Shumei through
16 SHIMIZU.

17 "ARIMA. 'This plot has been suspended
18 once. However, a thought of this kind will not
19 disappear altogether, but will reappear whenever an
20 opportunity presents itself, because the motives of
21 planning this plot were

22 "(1) that the permeation of Communism has
23 been so noticeable recently that this country might
24 fall into Communists' hands if the agitation was
25 left unchecked.

1 "(2) No movement will attain its object,
2 unless it is carried out under the Imperial rule.

3 "(3) Wherefore, the OKAWA's faction advo-
4 cates Socialistic Nationalism under the Imperial
5 rule and the establishment of an Autocratic govern-
6 ment in place of the present political party system.

7 "(4) A certain militarists' group has
8 responded to this and shook hands with the OKAWA's
9 faction for the purpose of creating such a Fascists'
10 government as existing in Italy.'

11 "In view of the above reasons, we shall
12 have to think up an adequate counter-measure.
13 Especially, the Imperial Household should have full
14 understanding of the situation and take necessary
15 steps about it. We found the point of agreement in
16 our opinions, and we arranged that we meet and dis-
17 cuss this matter as frequently as possible."

18 The next entry is number 1632-F, 1931,
19 September 10, Thursday -- "Had lunch with Mr. OKABE,
20 Mr. ODA and Mr. TANI, the head of the Asiatic Bureau,
21 at Prince KONOYE's house. Mr. TANI told us about
22 the China Affairs and gave his opinion. His opinion
23 was that self defensive action might be unavoidable
24 according to developments in the future. I agree
25 with it, in general."

1 1632-E, September 12, '31, Saturday --

2 "At noon I met Mr. HARADA at Ginza Dining Hall and
3 talked in detail about the latest under-handed move-
4 ment of the Army."

5 1632-I, September 19, 1931 -- "At 1:30 the
6 Prime Minister went to see the Emperor. I was told
7 that our Army would not try to enlarge the situation
8 but would stop any further action when it found it-
9 self in an advantageous position.

10 "A telephone call came from Mr. HARADA
11 telling me to meet at the official residence of
12 the Minister of the Imperial Household at 8:30.

13 "The Minister of the Imperial Household,
14 the Grand Chamberlain and Mr. HARADA were there. Mr.
15 HARADA reported that he was called by the Prime
16 Minister at about 6:30 and that he was asked about
17 the state of affairs. He said that the Army's atti-
18 tude was very strong. He added that in regard to
19 the policies decided upon by the cabinet, the Premier
20 seemed to be worrying because the Army was not driv-
21 ing it home thoroughly. The Premier, therefore,
22 wanted to find the best way for controlling the Army.
23 Some said that it might be best to ask for Prince
24 KAN-IN's help, and the others said that they should
25 ask the 'GENRO' to stay in Tokyo. But I told them

1 that the Premier should not depend on others in the
2 solution of this situation at this critical time.
3 I emphasized that there was no other alternative
4 but for the cabinet to hold meetings repeatedly and
5 for days, even if futile, and to indicate a firm
6 opinion of its own for the unification of national
7 opinion."

8 1632-V, September 21, Monday --"At 9:30 I
9 went to the office. The Lord Keeper of the Privy
10 Seal came to Tokyo last night. The Lord Keeper of
11 the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain and Vice-Grand
12 Chamberlain, the head of the Army Aide-de-camp and
13 I gathered in the room of the Lord Keeper of the
14 Privy Seal and conferred about the China and
15 Manchukuo conflict.

16 "Baron HARADA telephoned me from Kyoto asking
17 if there were any further developments in the situa-
18 tion, and suggested that if the Emperor were to call
19 Prince KAN-IN, we would discuss thoroughly the
20 Prince's answer to the Emperor. HARADA phoned me
21 again that evening. He transmitted Prince SAIONJI's
22 words to be cautious about his (KANAYA) answer when
23 KANAYA, the Chief of the General Staff would go to
24 see the Emperor to explain why the Korean Army had
25 advanced into Manchukuo without the Emperor's sanction.

1 "At 7:30 p.m., after dinner, I visited the
2 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official resi-
3 dence and transmitted HARADA's telephonic message.
4 On my way home, I stopped at TAKEUCHI's house. But
5 I could not see him, as he was on a business trip."

6 1632-J, 1931, September 22, Tuesday --
7 "At 1:30 I visited Mr. HARADA's house again. KONOYE,
8 SAKAI, OKABE, and TAKAGI came there. Discussed and
9 studied various things coming from various direc-
10 tions.

11 "The Army is so strongly determined in its
12 positive policy toward Manchuria that orders given
13 by the Central Authorities may not be carried out.

14 "The Emperor has expressed satisfaction
15 and approval to the Prime Minister and the Minister
16 of War for the governmental policy to strive not to
17 extend further the Manchurian Incident. However, the
18 Army is reported to have construed and to be indig-
19 nant, that the Emperor's opinion had been so induced
20 to form by his personal attendants.

21 "In view of such circumstances, it was
22 decided among us that the Emperor had better not say
23 anything further about the Manchurian policy, unless
24 he is necessitated to do so, and that the GENRO
25 (meaning Prince SAIONJI) against whom the Army

1 harbors antipathy, had better not make a trip to
2 Tokyo unless there is an important change in the
3 situation, because it would intensify the mili-
4 tarist's antipathy."

5 1632-K, September 23, Wednesday, 1931 --

6 "At 2:00 p.m., attended tea party thrown for Gentle-
7 men of the Press at KASUMIYAMA Club. Heard the
8 course of events in the Manchurian Incident from
9 HAYASHI, the head of Maintenance Bureau of the
10 Department of War. However, as the cause of the
11 railway explosion, the most important point of the
12 whole affair was not explained clearly, I asked him
13 the question. To this, he replied that he had not
14 as yet received the report. It seems very strange
15 to me. It is regrettable also, not to be posted
16 and informed on this point, especially when people
17 are talking with skepticism about the cause of this
18 accident."

19 1632-L, September 29, Tuesday -- "At

20 9 o'clock, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy
21 Seal at his official residence and reported what I
22 had heard from HARADA last night; namely, what the
23 Chief of the Army General Staff had told to the
24 Premier, 'Chances are the Army is compelled to send
25 troops to the Yangtze River area. If this happens,

1 he does not want the trouble regarding the reversion
2 of Supreme Command -- that is to say, the Government
3 shall not interfere with the prerogative of the
4 Supreme Command of the Army."

5 1632-M, 1931, October 1, Thursday --

6 "At 4 o'clock, I visited Mr. HARADA. Also present
7 were Prince KONOYE and Mr. SHIRATORI. We discussed
8 and consulted upon the militarist's secret plot.
9 The combination of the middle class elements of the
10 Army is likely to be pretty tight, and the plan to
11 break down the present political party system by
12 means of effecting coup-d'etat and to administer
13 national affairs under dictatorship has been made
14 secretly ever since the 2nd year of Showa era (1927).
15 This is a serious problem indeed! It will be impos-
16 sible for our statesmen and politicians to realize
17 the danger of such a problem. It is very difficult
18 to devise a counter measure. Anyway, it will be
19 necessary to guide those militarists so that they
20 won't cause the nation a serious damage and unnec-
21 essary sacrifice. It is a national calamity."

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1 Document No. 1632-N, dated October 5, 1931 --
2 "At 4:30 I visited Minister of the Imperial Household
3 ICHIKI, at his official residence with Prince KONOYE.
4 We discussed the Army's stubbornness and its in-
5 trigues. We gave him all information available and
6 asked him to think up the best solution to this matter."

7 Document No. 1632-O, dated October 6, 1931 --
8 "The Prime Minister seemed to have talked about the
9 serious situation to the Lord Keeper. The thing
10 worrying the Prime Minister is that there is a risk
11 of head-on collision with the Army about the question
12 of the other party with whom to negotiate the Man-
13 churian problem."

14 Document No. 1632-P, dated October 7, 1931 --
15 "At 7 p.m. HARADA came to my house and we went to
16 see Marquis INOUE at Uchidayama. We heard the opin-
17 ions of the current problem of the Army Department
18 from Lt. Colonel SUZUKI. Activities in which Lt.
19 Colonel SUZUKI takes part do not intend to carry out
20 the national reformation immediately, but it is to
21 save the situation if something does happen in the
22 future, such as the outbreak of rebellion among the
23 young officers. On the way home, I reported to
24 Prince KONOYE about the above matter."

25 Document No. 1632-Q, dated October 14, 1931 --

1 "At noon I went to Count Tadamasa SAKAI's house and
2 had a conference with Masatoku YASOUKA, Chokei OKABE,
3 Manabu MATSUMOTO, Shigeru YOSHIDA, and Fumio GOTO
4 regarding the current problems. According to Mr.
5 YASUOKA, the plots of the Army are progressing rapidly
6 and students and Ronins are participating in it.
7 'Something must be done regarding this matter,' he
8 said. Our opinion was that Shashokukai /TN. an
9 association/ which had been previously planned by
10 YASUOKA and others, should be materialized as a per-
11 manent counter measure."

12 Document No. 1632-R, dated October 15, 1931 --

13 "At 1:30 I attended a tea party of the managing staffs
14 of the newspapers. The Chief of the Information,
15 SHIRATORI, Chief of the Maintenance Bureau, HAYASHI,
16 and I had a conference on the situation.

17 HAYASHI, upon a premise that it was his own assump-
18 tion, gave the following statement:

19 "It will be unwise to take time in solving
20 the Manchurian question, from the Army's point of
21 view in governing disciplines. It requires prompt
22 solution. In order to reach prompt solution, it will
23 be necessary to create a new regime in Manchuria. If
24 the Central Authorities should give the agitators of
25 the movement a tacit approval to do so, it will

1 facilitate the solution of the problem.'

2 "He indicated by his statement the fact that the
3 militarists still stuck to its plan to establish a
4 new regime in Manchuria. On the other hand, it is
5 said that the attitude of the militarists suddenly
6 stiffened, taking advantage of the rumor that Count
7 UCHIDA, the President of South Manchuria Railway
8 Company, had the intention to settle the pending
9 question by one effort -- the establishment of a
10 new regime in Manchuria."

11 If the Court please, we would like to call
12 General TANAKA to the witness stand at this time for
13 interrogation.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

15 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, I would like to
16 call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that
17 already in the diary there has appeared the name of
18 Chamberlain SUZUKI and Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI.
19 Throughout these proceedings there will appear the
20 name of SUZUKI, and I simply want to direct the at-
21 tention of the Tribunal that the defendant is Lieu-
22 tenant Colonel SUZUKI, Teiichi, subsequently Lieu-
23 tenant General; so that no confusion may be had with
24 respect to the person who is mentioned in any of
25 these proceedings.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

2 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: Mr. President, the
3 witness is in court and will now be sworn.

4 The witness will now sign the oath of
5 witness and affix his seal.

6 Mr. President, the witness has been sworn.

7 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
8 fifteen minutes.

9 (Whereupon, at 1045 a recess
10 was taken until 1100, after which the pro-
11 ceedings were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now
2 resumed.

3 R Y U K I C H I T A N A K A, called as a witness
4 on behalf of the prosecution, being first duly
5 sworn, testified as follows:

6 MR. SACKETT: I might state to the Court
7 that we propose to interrogate this witness orally
8 and not use an affidavit.

9 DIRECT EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. SACKETT:

11 Q Will you state your name, please, sir?

12 A TANAKA, Ryukichi.

13 Q How old are you?

14 A Fifty-four.

15 Q What is your present business or occupation?

16 A No employment.

17 Q Did you ever serve in the Imperial Japanese
18 Army?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Will you state the periods of time?

21 A 1914 to 1942.

22 Q Will you state in detail the various posi-
23 tions you held with the Army during those years?

24 A Second Lieutenant, Japanese Army, December,
25 1914; graduated Naval -- Military Staff College,

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1 October, 1921; attached to the Army General Staff,
2 December 1, 1922; attached to the First Division on
3 maneuvers of the Army General Staff up to December,
4 1925; attached to the Second Division, Army General
5 Staff Investigation, December, 1925, to August, 1927;
6 resident Peiping, China, August, 1927, assisted in the
7 business of the Japanese Legation on some occasions;
8 Chief of the Investigation Department, Army General
9 Staff, August 1, 1929; at the same time promoted to
10 Major; Assistant Military Attache of the Attache's
11 Office, Japanese Embassy, Changhai, 1 October 1930;
12 Commander, Battalion, Fourth Regiment of Field
13 Artillery in Osaka, August 1, 1932; before becoming
14 Battalion Commander, traveled for two months in
15 China, Manchuria and Korea; attached to the First
16 Artillery of the Field Artillery Regiment, Tokyo,
17 March 1, 1934; Assistant or Deputy Commander,
18 according to the American terminology; Staff Officer,
19 Kwantung Army, 1 March 1935; at the same time pro-
20 moted to Lieutenant Colonel; Commander, 25th Regiment,
21 at Ranan, Korea, August 1, 1937.

22 THE MONITOR: Correction: "25th Mountain
23 Artillery -- Pack Artillery Regiment.

24 A (Continuing) Attached to the Tojo Army
25 Corps in Inner Mongolia for two months before

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1 becoming Regimental Commander in Korea; Chief of the
2 Military Service Section, War Office, Tokyo, 1 Decem-
3 ber 1938 -- I failed to say that on 1 August 1937
4 was promoted to full Colonel -- Chief Staff Officer,
5 First Army in Taigen, China, 1 March 1940--

6 THE MONITOR: "Taiyuan, China."

7 A (Continuing) In Shansi Province; Chief of
8 the Military Service Bureau, War Office, Tokyo,
9 1 December 1940; dismissed, September, 1942. That's
10 all.

11 Q What was your rank at the time of your dis-
12 missal, sir?

13 A Major General.

14 Q In the course of your official duties, did
15 you ever have occasion to make any investigation of
16 Army personnel?

17 A As to personnel, no; but as to criminal
18 action on the part of Army personnel, yes.

19 Q In the course of your official duties, did
20 you ever have occasion to make any investigation of
21 events or incidents that occurred within the Army?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Was that on one or more than one occasion?

24 A In accordance with my duties, I conducted
25 such investigation when necessary, whether in the

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1 past or present.

2 Q In the course of such investigations, did you
3 have access to or custody of any official Army records?

4 A Yes, various official documents as well as
5 reports of the Japanese military police.

6 Q You stated that in 1940 you became Chief of
7 the Military Service and Discipline Bureau of the
8 War Ministry. What, if anything, did that Bureau
9 have to do with investigations?

10 A One of the principal duties of the Military
11 Service Bureau is to control and supervise morale
12 and morals of the entire Army.

13 Q As Chief of that Bureau did you have custody
14 and control of the prior records, investigations made
15 and filed with that Bureau?

16 A Yes.

17 Q Evidence has been introduced in this trial
18 of the killing of Marshal Chang Tso-lin on June 4,
19 1928. Who was Marshal Chang Tso-lin?

20 A Chang Tso-lin was a marshal, Chinese marshal,
21 who died in Mukden in 1928.

22 Q Do you know whether any official investiga-
23 tion of this killing was ever made by the Japanese
24 Army or Government?

25 A Yes, official investigation was conducted.

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1 Q How do you know this?

2 A In 1942 when the War Office was moved from
3 a place called Miyakezaka to Ichigaya. I had occasion
4 when cleaning up of various documents was conducted
5 at the time to read various documents in the Urgent
6 File of the Chief of the Bureau with reference to
7 the May 15 Incident, the February 26 Incident, among
8 which these documents were found.

9 Q What was your position at that time?

10 A Chief of the Military Service Bureau, War
11 Office.

12 Q Was this document in your official custody
13 as Chief of that Bureau at that time?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Was it one of the official records of that
16 Bureau?

17 A Yes.

18 Q What year was it that you found this record?

19 A January 1942.

20 Q Do you know approximately when the report was
21 made?

22 A August 1928, if my recollections are not
23 mistaken.

24 Q State, if you know, who personally prepared
25 this report.

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1 A Major General MINE of the Tokyo Military
2 Police at the order of the then War Minister.

3 THE MONITOR: Correction: "Major General
4 MINE, who was the Chief of the Tokyo MP unit.

5 Q Did you read this report?

6 .. Yes.

7 Q Do you know where it is now?

8 A If it has not been lost it should be in
9 the Urgent File of the Chief of the Military Service
10 Bureau, War Office.

11 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, the
12 prosecution at this time would like to offer in
13 evidence prosecution's document No. 2214. I would
14 like to state that this is comprised of the corres-
15 pondence between the prosecution and the Japanese
16 Government with reference to the producing of this
17 report.

18 THE PRESIDENT: What does the correspondence
19 disclose?

20 MR. SACKETT: It discloses a request that
21 the report be produced and an answer from the Japan-
22 ese Government that it cannot be located and is not
23 available.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: It will be marked
25 exhibit No. 180.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted subject to the
2 usual terms.

3 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit
4 No. 180 was received in evidence.)

5 Q What did this official report that you
6 read have to say with reference to the death of
7 Marshal Chang Tso-lin? Tell us in detail.

8 A The killing of Chang Tso-lin was planned
9 by Senior Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, Colonel
10 KAWAMOTO. This incident had no connection whatso-
11 ever with the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung
12 Army at the time. The Kwantung Army, in accordance
13 with the policy of the TANAKA Cabinet to secure an
14 early settlement of Manchurian problems, endeavored
15 to disarm Chinese troops retreating from Mukden in
16 the direction of Peiping and Tsientsin, in the direction
17 of Kinshu, or Chinchow. The purpose was to get rid of
18 Marshal Chang Tso-lin and to set up a new state
19 separated from the Nanking Government with Chang
20 Hsueh-liang as leader; in other words, to create a
21 new state under Japanese control, a state of peace
22 and order which later became Manchukuo.

23 THE MONITOR: Correction: "Which was some-
24 thing like Manchukuo that came into existence later."
25

A (Continuing) However, this plan was banned

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1 by the TANAKA Cabinet later. However, Colonel
2 KAWAMOTO, still true to his own purpose of setting
3 up an area of peace and order in Manchuria, endeavored
4 to get rid of Chang Tso-lin and set up Chang
5 Hsueh-liang in his place. As a result, on June 3,
6 1927, the train which departed from Peiping was blown
7 up at the crossing of a South Manchurian Railway
8 and the Peiping-Mukden Railway, and as a result
9 Chang Tso-lin died. This dynamiting was carried
10 out by officers -- by part of the officers and non-
11 commissioned officers of the 20th Engineer Regiment
12 which had come to Mukden from Korea. At this time
13 Captain UZAKI, Staff Officer of Colonel KAWAMOTO
14 tried to return the fire which was opened by the
15 personal bodyguards of Chang Tso-lin. At that time
16 the plan was an immediate mustering of the forces
17 but this mustering of the forces -- Kwantung Army
18 forces -- was stopped by Chief of Staff of the Kwan-
19 tung Army, Lieutenant General SAITO. The composition
20 of the train was made clear -- the composition of the
21 passengers on the train was made quite clear by the
22 officer sent by Colonel KAWAMOTO -- was made quite
23 clear by an officer dispatched by Colonel KAWAMOTO
24 to Peiping and Shanhaikuan. That's all.
25

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1 by the TANAKA Cabinet later. However, Colonel
2 KAWAMOTO, still true to his own purpose of setting
3 up an area of peace and order in Manchuria, endeavored
4 to get rid of Chang Tso-lin and set up Chang
5 Hsueh-liang in his place. As a result, on June 3,
6 1927, the train which departed from Peiping was blown
7 up at the crossing of a South Manchurian Railway
8 and the Peiping-Mukden Railway, and as a result
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10 out by officers -- by part of the officers and non-
11 commissioned officers of the 20th Engineer Regiment
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15 personal bodyguards of Chang Tso-lin. At that time
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18 forces -- was stopped by Chief of Staff of the Kwan-
19 tung Army, Lieutenant General SAITO. The composition
20 of the train was made clear -- the composition of the
21 passengers on the train was made quite clear by the
22 officer sent by Colonel KAWAMOTO -- was made quite
23 clear by an officer dispatched by Colonel KAWAMOTO
24 to Peiping and Shanhaikuan. That's all.
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1 Q What did he say this report disclosed as
2 the reason or purpose for the killing of Marshal
3 Chang Tso-lin?

4 A The purpose was to create a new regime of
5 peace, law and tranquility of the north by separating
6 that area from the Nanking Government, and also by
7 getting rid of the war lords whose influence pre-
8 vailed in Manchuria.

9 MONITOR: Slight addition: separate from
10 the Nanking Government, which was conducting a
11 punitive expedition into Manchuria.

12 Q Did the report indicate the number of
13 people involved in the incident?

14 A Yes.

15 Q How many did it disclose?

16 A Colonel KAWAMOTO and ten some odd others.

17 Q Do you know Colonel KAWAMOTO personally?

18 A Yes, very intimately.

19 Q When did you first meet him?

20 A 1925.

21 Q Did you ever talk to him about the killing
22 of Marshal Chang Tso-lin?

23 A Yes.

24 Q When and where?

25 A In Manchukuo, 1935.

This page is correct

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1 Q What was your rank or position at that
2 time?

3 A Staff Officer, Kwantung Army; Lieutenant
4 General -- Lieutenant Colonel, Japanese Army.

5 Q Where is Colonel KAWAMOTO, if you know?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Where?

8 A In Taiyuan, Shansi Province, China.

9 Q In your conversation with him did he say
10 anything with reference to any plan or program in
11 June, 1928, on the part of the Kwantung Army, or any
12 elements thereof, concerning Manchuria?

13 A Yes, he told me what I have already stated.

14 Q What did he personally tell you with refer-
15 ence to the killing of Marshal Chang Tso-lin when
16 you talked to him?

17 MR. McMANUS: If your Honor please, I
18 object. It is strictly hearsay.

19 THE PRESIDENT: It is hearsay, but hearsay
20 is admissible.

21 MR. McMANUS: No question but what it is
22 hearsay.

23 THE PRESIDENT: It is admitted for what-
24 ever probative value it has. The objection is over-
25 ruled.

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1 A Colonel KAWAMOTO told me thusly: that if
2 the urgent mustering up of the Kwantung Army had
3 been carried out, then the Manchurian Incident would
4 have been carried out then and the State of
5 Manchukuo would have been created then. The ex-
6 plosive used at that time belonged to the Engineer's
7 Regiment No. 200, square dynamite 200.

8 MR. WARREN: May we have that answer again,
9 sir?

10 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It is not too clear,
11 is it?

12 WITNESS: The explosives used at that time
13 were square shaped explosives numbering approximately
14 two hundred, belonging to the Engineer Corps.

15 MONITOR: Correction: artillery unit.

16 Q What, if anything, did he say he had to do
17 with the killing?

18 A He told me that it was a plan of his own
19 alone.

20 Q Did he describe the part played, if any,
21 by Captain OZAKI?

22 A Yes.

23 Q What did he say?

24 A Captain OZAKI's purpose was to follow the
25 orders given by Colonel KAWAMOTO to muster the forces

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1 then in Mukden to open fire against the train
2 carrying Chang Tso-lin.

3 Q What, if anything, did he say as to the
4 purpose or reason for killing the Marshal?

5 A He said that the purpose was to get rid of
6 the war lords then prevailing in Manchuria and to
7 create a new regime separated from the Nanking
8 Government, a regime of peace and order under the
9 leadership of Chang Hsueh-liang.

10 Q In your conversation with him about the
11 killing of the Marshal what, if anything, was said
12 about Japanese control of Manchuria?

13 A Naturally, inasmuch as Colonel KAWAMOTO was
14 a strong advocate of a new state, an independent
15 State of Manchuria --

16 Q Well, what did he say?

17 A He said that a new state must be set up
18 in the area of Manchuria and separated from the
19 Nanking Government to place that regime under
20 Japanese control and leadership, and to develop
21 the area within, and also to strengthen this new
22 regime for purposes of Japanese national defense.

23 Q Did he disclose how many people were in-
24 volved in the Incident?

25 A Not in detail.

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1 Q Do you know Captain OZAKI that you have
2 mentioned as being involved in the Incident?

3 A Colonel KAWAMOTO definitely said that
4 Captain OZAKI had nothing to do with the explosion.

5 Q My question was: Do you know Captain
6 OZAKI?

7 A Yes, I know him well.

8 Q When did you first meet him?

9 A He was a colleague of mine when I was at-
10 tached to the Army General Staff in 1922.

11 Q Did you ever talk to him about the killing
12 of Marshal Chang Tso-lin?

13 A Yes.

14 Q When and where?

15 A I met him in Tokyo in 1929 when he was
16 being transferred from Manchuria as battalion
17 commander in Hokkaido.

18 Q What did he tell you on that occasion with
19 reference to the killing of Marshal Chang Tso-lin?

20 A He said that he had issued a mustering up
21 order at the command of Colonel KAWAMOTO, but that
22 he was reprimanded by the Chief of Staff of the
23 Kwantung Army, SAITO, who said what was the nec-
24 essity of using the Kwantung Army against such a
25 weak army as that of the Chinese.

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1 Q Did he say anything with reference to the
2 purpose for the killing of the Marshal?

3 A No.

4 Q In the year 1930 and the spring of 1931,
5 what was the attitude generally of the army toward
6 Manchuria?

7 A Following the Tsinan Incident and the Chang
8 Tso-lin Incident, Sino-Japanese relations became
9 extremely aggravated, both in China and Manchuria,
10 as a result of which the army took a very strong and
11 stiffened attitude.

12 MONITOR: The China-Japanese situation
13 became very aggravated and it was practically battle
14 conditions, without the declaration of war.

15 WITNESS: (Continuing) Since the fall of
16 1928 after Chang Hsueh-liang had succeeded Chang
17 Tso-lin as leader of Manchuria, said Chang Hsueh-liang
18 entered the Kuomintang and brought the Kuomintang
19 flag into Manchuria. As a result, Japanese-Chinese
20 relations in Manchuria became extremely aggravated,
21 and it was the strong attitude especially of the
22 army that in view of the great sacrifice Japan had
23 made in that area since the Russo-Japanese War this
24 pending question in Manchuria must be stopped de-
25 finitely.

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1 Q Were there any elements in the army ad-
2 vocating Japanese occupation of Manchuria in those
3 days?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Were there any elements in the army ad-
6 vocating the creation of an independent Manchuria
7 in those days?

8 A No, there was no advocacy of an independent
9 state in Manchuria, but when the situation had
10 reached such a state that diplomatic negotiations
11 were of no avail, it was the stand of members of
12 the army that armed force should be resorted to in
13 driving out the Chinese forces from Manchuria and
14 to set up a new regime under Japanese control, a
15 regime of peace and order.

16 Q Then your answer is that there were
17 elements in 1930 and 1931 that advocated the
18 creation of an independent Manchuria?

19 MR. WARREN: If the Court please, we wish
20 to object to that question.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is objectionable.
22 Objection sustained.

23 Q How do you know these elements in the army
24 advocated the things you have testified to?

25 A At that time I was in the General Staff

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1 office and was carrying on investigations on Man-
2 churian problems, therefore I know. I am well ac-
3 quainted with the matter.

4 Q To your knowledge, were there any civilians
5 at that time who advocated the same thing?

6 A This was my friend OKAWA, Shumei.

7 Q State, if you know, who among the military
8 group in Japan in the Spring of 1931 and in 1930
9 were the leading advocates of what you have testified
10 to.

11 A One of the very strong advocates was my
12 senior officer, the then Major General TATEKAWA, who
13 was chief of the Second Division, General Staff.
14 Among civilians it was a group which was centered
15 around OKAWA, Shumei. Others advocating this strongly
16 from the Spring of 1931 was my friend HASHIMOTO,
17 Kingoro, and Captain Cho, Isamu, who was a member of
18 the Sakura-Kai.

19 MONITOR: Correction: In place of from
20 the Spring of 1931, in 1930 and the Spring of 1931.

21 Q Who, if any, were the leaders of this policy
22 in the Kwantung Army?

23 A I recall that it was Colonel ITAGAKI,
24 Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, and Staff Officer,
25 Lieutenant Colonel ISHIHARA, Kanji.

TANAKA

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1 Q Is the HASHIMOTO you mention one of the
2 accused in this case?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Is that likewise true of Doctor OKAWA?

5 A Yes.

6 Q Is ITAGAKI one of the accused in this case?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Did you ever hear of an organization called
9 Sakura-kai?

10 A Yes.

11 Q State possibly when it was founded, if
12 you know?

13 A The organization of Sakura-kai itself was
14 formally organized in the spring of 1931, if I re-
15 call, but the first meeting for the purpose of or-
16 ganizing this society was held on October 1, 1930.
17 I don't recall which, the Kaiko-sha or the Fujim-tei
18 in Kudan, Tokyo. I personally attended this meeting.

19 Q Who organized the Sakura-kai, if you know?

20 A Since I had left Tokyo on the night of
21 October 1st for Shanghai, I don't know who organized
22 the society, or who were leaders of the society,
23 but I recall that the meeting of first December was
24 called by the then Lieutenant Colonel HASHIMOTO.

25 Q Do you know what type or class of people

TANAKA

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1 made up the membership of this organization?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Will you state to the Tribunal who they
4 were?

5 A At the meeting on first October the
6 officers were from the Inspector General of Military
7 Education, the War Office, and the General Staff.
8 Their rank, lieutenant colonels and majors. There
9 were also five or six officers from the navy. And
10 I think this society continued to expand with these
11 men as its nucleus.

12 Q Do you know the approximate size of the
13 organization?

14 A If my memory serves me correctly, about
15 fifty or sixty officers at the meeting held on
16 first October. From what I learned from Captain
17 CHO later, the membership increased following its
18 organization in the spring of 1931 with students from
19 the Army Staff College and the Artillery Engineer
20 School.

21 Q What were the objectives of this organiza-
22 tion, if you know?

23 A The meeting on first October did not touch
24 at all on Manchurian problems. At that time domestic
25 questions within Japan were extremely acute.

1 There was continuous controversy in political
2 circles, the state of political affairs was par-
3 ticularly low, and even in the ideological field
4 Japan was in a very bad condition. It was our be-
5 lief then that if things were left alone Japan would
6 shortly decline as a nation and as a people, and it
7 was our desire to do our utmost to cleanse politics
8 in Japan and to renovate the country. According to
9 what Captain Cho told me in Shanghai, the purpose
10 of the Sakura-kai was two-fold: one, to carry out
11 an internal revolution, or renovation, and, second,
12 to settle the Manchurian problem.

13 MONITOR: This was after the Manchurian In-
14 cident.

15 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half
16 past one.

17 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
18 taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by SHIMANOUCHI, Toshio, and SHIMADA, Masakazu, Hidekazu Hayashi acting as Monitor.)

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: I have here a certificate from the prison medical officer at Sugamo, reading:

"This is to certify that Kiichiro HIRANUMA is under treatment for an upper respiratory infection. It is expected that he will again be able to attend the trials on 8 July 1946."

Let that certificate be recorded.

- - -

RYUKICHI TANAKA, called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows:

BY MR. SACKETT (Continued):

Q General TANAKA, evidence has been introduced in this case in reference to the Manchurian Incident which took place on September 18, 1931. Are you familiar with the facts and circumstances of this Incident?

TANAKA

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1 A Yes.

2 Q Do you know whether or not the Manchurian
3 Incident came about as a result of a plan, as dis-
4 tinguished from being spontaneous?

5 A Yes.

6 Q Do you know the leading Japanese individuals
7 who were involved in the plan?

8 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, we
9 want to object. The first question was leading and
10 no objection was made. This witness has not testi-
11 fied there was any plan. He just simply stated that
12 he knew what it was. Counsel keeps insisting on
13 assuming facts that are not in evidence and on
14 putting words in the witness' mouth.

15 We object to it.

16 THE PRESIDENT: I do not see any grounds
17 for objection. He was asked whether this was the
18 result of a plan or whether it was something sponta-
19 neous. There is nothing leading there.

20 Objection overruled.

21 Q General TANAKA, to your knowledge, was the
22 Manchurian Incident a planned incident?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Do you know the leading Japanese people or
25 individuals that were involved in this plan; and if

TANAKA

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1 so, state who they were.

2 A Speaking from the subjective point of view,
3 one of the leaders at that time in Japan was the
4 Chief of the Second Division of the Army General
5 Staff, the then Major General TATEKAWA; among others,
6 leader of the Sakura-Kai, the then Lieutenant Colonel
7 HASHIMOTO; and among civilians, a group under the
8 leadership of OKAWA, Shumei.

9 THE MONITOR: HASHIMOTO as well as Cho, Isamu.

10 Q What was that last answer?

11 A Major General TATEKAWA; of the Sakura-Kai
12 members, Lieutenant Colonel HASHIMOTO, and Captain
13 Isamu Cho.

14 Q Were there any individuals among the Kwan-
15 tung Army that you would classify as leaders in the
16 plan?

17 A According to what Captain Cho and Lieutenant
18 Colonel HASHIMOTO told me, the leaders in the Kwan-
19 tung Army were the Chief of Staff, the then Colonel
20 ITAGAKI, and Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant
21 Colonel ISHIHARA, Kanji.

22 Q Were HASHIMOTO, OKAWA, and ITAGAKI mentioned,
23 each accused in this case?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Will you state, if you know, what the plan

TANAKA

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1 was and its objectives?

2 A The stories told on this subject, on this
3 problem, by ITAGAKI, HASHIMOTO, and Cho are all
4 different. But the plan and objective, as I view it
5 subjectively, is that the internal situation in
6 Japan was extremely serious and aggravated at the
7 time, and, furthermore, the relationship between China
8 and Japan was also seriously aggravated. The plan
9 and objective was to find a solution to this
10 situation.

11 To carry out this purpose, it was the intent
12 of those who were concerned to destroy the Chinese
13 war lords then in Manchuria, to set up a new country
14 based on the kingly way and a country maintaining
15 peace, tranquility, and order, a country inseparably
16 bound in their relationships between Japan and Man-
17 churia, a country under the control of Japan, so that
18 close cooperation and coordination may be made in the
19 economic exploitation of this area and thereby to
20 stabilize the Japanese conditions at home, as well
21 as to make of Japan a stabilizing factor in East Asia.

22 Q Did you ever talk to any of these people
23 you have mentioned concerning the Manchurian
24 Incident?

25 A Yes.

TANAKA

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1 Q You mentioned the accused HASHIMOTO. Do you
2 know him?

3 A Yes. He is my friend.

4 Q When did you first meet him?

5 A In 1929, when Lieutenant Colonel HASHIMOTO
6 returned from Turkey and Russia, as Chief of that
7 section, and before that in the Army Staff College
8 when we were together.

9 Q Is he in the courtroom today?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Will you point him out to the Court by
12 indicating where he is seated in the courtroom?

13 A (Pointing) To the extreme left, second row.

14 Q Did you ever serve with or under him in the
15 army?

16 A Not under him. But I served with him as a
17 colleague in the Army General Staff office.

18 Q Did you talk to him on any occasion about
19 the Manchurian Incident?

20 A Yes.

21 Q When and where was that?

22 A At the Akebono-so Restaurant in Kojimachi
23 Ward in Tokyo in the Fall of 1934.

24 Q What if anything did he tell you on that
25 occasion as to whether or not the events that took

1 place in Manchuria on the night of September 18,
2 1931, were planned in advance?

3 A Yes.

4 Q What did he say with reference to whether
5 or not it was planned?

6 A He told me that the Manchurian Incident was
7 planned by the Kwantung Army and that he, in accord-
8 ance with this plan, would assist and support the
9 Incident and by that means endeavor to bring about a
10 renovation of internal politics in Japan, which at
11 that time was extremely corrupted. He also said
12 that he and Captain Cho had planned the October Inci-
13 dent that had failed. But he also said that in
14 spite of that failure they had succeeded in creating
15 a new state, Manchukuo.

16 He also said that at first it was the plan
17 of the Kwantung Army to exploit Manchuria while under
18 the Japanese Kwantung Army occupation, but that he
19 had urged that a new and independent state be created
20 in order to avoid international complications. And
21 this proposal of his was taken up.

22 Q Did he tell you who was involved in the
23 plan, by name?

24 A In Japan it was Major General TATEKAWA, Chief
25 of the First Division, Army General Staff, who led

TANAKA

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1 and supervised HASHIMOTO and Ohno. And among civilians,
2 it was a group centering around OKAWA. In Manchuria
3 it was Colonel ITAGAKI and Lieutenant Colonel
4 HASHIMOTO, both of whom carried out the plan. That
5 is all.

6 Q Did he tell you what the ultimate objectives
7 of the plan were?

8 A Yes.

9 Q What did he say?

10 A To make of Manchuria a base from which to
11 bring about the revival of Asia.

12 Q Did he say whether or not the Kwantung Army
13 was involved in the plan?

14 A He just pointed out the name, Kwantung Army.

15 Q What did he say when he pointed out the name,
16 if anything?

17 THE MONITOR: Correction: He just pointed
18 out the name, Kwantung Army, and did not mention any
19 individual's name.

20 Q Well, what did he say if anything when he
21 mentioned the Kwantung Army?

22 A He said that the central figures in the
23 Kwantung Army were Colonel ITAGAKI and Lieutenant
24 Colonel ISHIHARA.

25 Q Did he say anything with reference to what

TANAKA

DIRECT

1 the Kwantung Army advocated concerning Manchuria at
2 the time of the Incident?

3 A He said that it was the Kwantung Army's
4 intention to occupy Manchuria, to destroy the in-
5 fluence of the war lords in that area, and to bring
6 about the economic development of that territory
7 under army occupation.

8 Q What position did the accused HASHIMOTO hold
9 at the time of the Incident, if you know?

10 A Yes. He was Chief of the Russian Section,
11 Second Division, General Staff office in Tokyo.

12 Q Did HASHIMOTO tell you what particular
13 part he played in the plan?

14 A What do you mean by special part he played
15 in this plan?

16 Q Did HASHIMOTO tell you what if anything he
17 did with reference to the plan he described to you?

18 A He said that together with Cho, the desire
19 was, before the outbreak of the Incident, to bring
20 about a positive settlement of Manchurian problems,
21 and with this end in view to work within the army.
22 After the Incident, however, he planned the October
23 Incident in order to bring the downfall of the weak
24 and corrupted government in Japan and to concentrate
25 Japanese public opinion on Manchurian affairs.

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1 Q You have referred on several occasions to
2 the October Incident. What year are you referring
3 to?

4 A October, 1931.
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1 Q Are you familiar with the facts and circum-
2 stances of the October Incident?

3 A I was not acquainted with the details, since
4 I was at that time in Shanghai, but I learned of those
5 details from Captain Cho when he visited Shanghai in
6 June, 1932.

7 Q What did he tell you?

8 A He said that the purpose of the October In-
9 cident was to cleanse the ideological and political
10 atmosphere of that time, which was extremely corrupted;
11 to renovate internal Japanese politics by assassinating
12 the leaders of the government at that time; to set up
13 a new renovated government, and thereby save the nation;
14 and then to bring about unity among the people in order
15 to secure their unanimous support of the settlement of
16 the Manchurian situation.

17 Q What, if anything, did HASHIMOTO say to you
18 with reference to the October Incident?

19 A He told me exactly what Captain Cho had told me.

20 Q What position did TATEKAWA hold at the time of
21 the Incident?

22 A Chief of the First Division, General Staff
23 Office.

24 Q Did HASHIMOTO, in his conversation with you,
25 tell you what part TATEKAWA played in the plan?

TANAKA

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1 A Yes.

2 Q What did he say?

3 A TATEKAWA was a leader of SAITO -- Lieutenant
4 Colonel HASHIMOTO and Captain Cho were most enthusi-
5 astic about the Incident, and he was also -- TATEKAWA
6 was also most enthusiastic advocate of the Manchurian
7 independence.

8 THE MONITOR: Correction: Not leader, but
9 supporter.

10 Q What position did Cho hold at the time of
11 the Manchurian Incident?

12 A Attached to the China Section, Second Division,
13 General Staff Office.

14 Q Did HASHIMOTO tell you what part he played in
15 the plan?

16 A Yes.

17 Q What did he say?

18 A Cho was HASHIMOTO's most trusted colleague.

19 Q What position did Dr. OKAWA hold at the time
20 of the Incident?

21 A Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
22 East Asia Economic Research Bureau of the South Man-
23 churian Railway, Limited.

24 Q What, if anything, did HASHIMOTO tell you as
25 to the part Dr. OKAWA played in the plan?

TANAKA

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1 A He said that with reference to the Manchurian
2 Incident.-- the decisive settlement of the Manchurian
3 Incident and problem, as well as the internal renova-
4 tion in Japan, he most enthusiastically cooperated in
5 the plan.

6 Q What position did ITAGAKI hold at the time of
7 the Incident?

8 A Senior Staff Officer, Kwantung Army.

9 Q What part did HASHIMOTO tell you he played in
10 the plan, if any?

11 A Yes.

12 Q I said, what part you were told he played in
13 the plan, if any?

14 A Together with ISHIHARA, ITAGAKI was a key
15 figure in the Kwantung Army.

16 Q Did HASHIMOTO tell you whether or not the
17 events that happened on September 18 were the result
18 of the plan he described to you?

19 A Will you repeat that again?

20 Q Did HASHIMOTO tell you whether or not the
21 events that happened on the night of September 18, 1931,
22 were the result of the plan he described to you?

23 A Yes.

24 Q What did he say?

25 A He said this Incident had provided an

TANAKA

DIRECT

1 opportunity and a chance to create Manchukuo.

2 Q Did he tell you whether or not the occupation
3 of Manchuria, which followed the night of September 18,
4 was the result of the plan he disclosed to you?

5 A Yes.

6 Q What did he say?

7 A He said that at first the purpose was to
8 utilize this Incident to seek the economic exploita-
9 tion and development of the area under Japanese army
10 occupation. However, he suggested that if such ar-
11 rangement were taken, it would produce undesirable
12 effects internationally, and, therefore, the political
13 and -- therefore, an independent Manchuria should be
14 created in order to develop this area, and thereby
15 to solve the economic and political crisis in Japan,
16 and by so doing to save Japan from her predicament at
17 that time.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: He said that
19 this Incident at first -- had been the intention at
20 first -- was to utilize this Incident in Manchuria.

21 The intention of the Kwantung Army was to
22 bring about the economic exploitation of the area under
23 army occupation and to place this area and Japan on a
24 basis of inseparable relationship, and by so doing to
25 seek the solution to the economic and political crisis

TANAKA

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1 which then was seriously aggravated in Japan, and by
2 seeking such solutions to save Japan from her diffi-
3 cult predicament. However, he said that he believed
4 he regarded occupation as being undesirable from the
5 international point of view, and proposed that an in-
6 dependent state be created under Japanese control, and
7 suggested accordingly to the Kwantung Army.

8 Q Did HASHIMOTO say anything as to what this
9 group of people that he named planned to do, if any-
10 thing, if the Japanese government did not support the
11 occupation of Manchuria?

12 A Yes.

13 Q What did he say?

14 A He said that the WAKATSUKI Cabinet was ex-
15 tremely weak.

16 Q I would like to ask you that question again.

17 A He said that the attitude of the WAKATSUKI
18 Cabinet was extremely weak and exceedingly passive
19 with respect to the Manchurian Incident.

20 Q Did HASHIMOTO say anything to you in your
21 conversation with him on that occasion as to what, if
22 anything, this group of people that he named planned
23 to do if the government in Japan did not support the
24 occupation of Manchuria?

25 A Yes.

TANAKA

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1 Q What did he say?

2 A As I said before, he said that it was the
3 plan of the SAKURA-KAI and its members, and among
4 civilians in collaboration with OKAWA's group, to
5 bring about a coup d'etat in Tokyo with which to de-
6 stroy the government then in power, to set up a new
7 government, and with the power of the new government
8 to rally the support of the entire population toward
9 the settlement of the Manchurian Incident. This was
10 the October Incident of 1931.

11 Q You have mentioned the accused, Dr. OKAWA.
12 Do you know him?

13 A Yes. He is a friend of mine.

14 Q When did you first meet him?

15 A In 1925.

16 Q Did you ever work with or under him?

17 A No.

18 Q Is he among the accused in the courtroom
19 today?

20 A No, he is not.

21 Q Did you ever talk to Dr. OKAWA prior to
22 September 18, 1931, with reference to Manchuria?

23 A Yes.

24 Q When and where did you talk to him?

25 A I had spoken of Manchurian problems with him

TANAKA

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1 quite frequently, but I think that since he had con-
2 sidered a separationist movement between Nanking and
3 Manchuria in 1930 -- it was in the summer of 1930 that
4 I met him.

5 Q What did he say to you at that time with ref-
6 erence to Manchuria?

7 A With reference to Manchuria, he said that
8 by all means Manchuria must be separated from the
9 Nanking government, and place the new area under
10 Japanese control; to create a land founded on the
11 principle of the kingly way -- a land of peace, law
12 and order. He said that since the first part of the
13 17th Century Asia has been under constant western ag-
14 gression by the white race, and that Asia is either
15 colonial -- has become a colonial area -- or Asia's
16 territories has become either colonial or semi-colonial.
17 He said outside of the people of Japan all the people
18 of Asia are now suppressed and oppressed people. He
19 said, furthermore, that after setting up an inde-
20 pendent Manchuria a relationship -- an inseparable
21 relationship should be established between Japan
22 and Manchuria, and that with the growth of Japan's
23 national strength, Japan as leader of the peoples of
24 Asia endeavored to drive out the white race from this
25 area, to bring about the emancipation of Asiatic

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1 peoples, and also to bring about the revival of Asia.
2 He furthermore said that he had gone to Manchuria in
3 the first part of 1930 to talk with Chang Hsueh-liang
4 and had proposed this idea of his to the young Mar-
5 shal. But Chang Hsueh-liang showed no desire what-
6 soever nor any agreement to OKAWA's plan. That being
7 the case, in the light of the fact that Sino-Japanese
8 relations had been so aggravated at that time, OKAWA said
9 that the only way to bring about the fulfillment of that
10 ideal was by force of arms.

11 Q Was your talk with Dr. OKAWA, about the Man-
12 churian Incident, after it occurred?

13 A Yes.

14 Q When and where was that?

15 A In November, 1934, after OKAWA had been re-
16 leased from prison as a result of his involvement in
17 the May 15 Incident; when he was released from prison
18 I paid him a visit.

19 Q Where did you visit him?

20 A At his home in Meguro, Tokyo.

21 Q On that occasion what, if anything, did he
22 have to say as to whether or not the Manchurian In-
23 cident was the result of planning?

24 A Yes.

25 Q What did he say?

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1 A He said that with respect to the Manchurian
2 Incident, ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA are the central figures
3 in the Kwantung Army. In Japan he said that the lead-
4 ers were Colonel HASHIMOTO, Major Cho, and himself,
5 and their purpose was to carry out the October Inci-
6 dent in order to clean out party politics and to
7 renovate the Japanese government. However, he said
8 that the October Incident failed on account of the
9 betrayal of Lieutenant Colonel NEMOTO.

10 Q Did he say what the plan involved, insofar
11 as Manchuria was concerned?

12 A He said that the independence of Manchuria,
13 which he had as an ideal since his youth, was the
14 first step in the emancipation of Asia.

15 Q What part, if any, did he say he played in
16 the plan?

17 A Yes.
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1 Q What did he say?

2 A Before the Manchurian Incident he said --
3 he said that before the Manchurian Incident he had
4 traveled all over Japan propagandizing to the effect
5 that Manchuria must be placed under Japanese control.
6 While on this lecture tour he also stressed at the
7 same time the importance of a general renovation in
8 Japan both in the field of thought and economics.
9 He said that the result of this lecture tour was
10 very effective.

11 At the time of the outbreak of the Manchur-
12 ian Incident, Japanese politicians and financiers,
13 he said -- financiers and others in high circles,
14 he said, were extremely weak and reflected that
15 weakness in their attitude toward various problems;
16 and that he sought to oppose them to bring about their
17 downfall in order to realize the renovation of Japan.
18 This renovation was to be carried out on the part
19 of the Army by HASHIMOTO, Cho and their group; on
20 the civilian side by OKAWA and his group; and that
21 they were to cooperate and collaborate with each
22 other in a grand coup d'etat with the objective of
23 overthrowing the government and then, by setting up
24 a new and renovated government, to cleanse politics
25 and political administration, to rally public opinion

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1 and all the efforts of the people toward the settle-
2 ment of the Manchurian problem.

3 That is all.

4 Q In this conversation you had with Dr. OKAWA,
5 did he say anything as to whether or not the events
6 that took place on the night of September 18 were
7 the result of the plan he disclosed to you?

8 A Yes.

9 Q What did he say?

10 A He said that in Manchuria, as I said before,
11 the leaders were ITAGAKI and HASHIMOTO; that in
12 Japan itself the leader was himself -- that is,
13 OKAWA -- who would devote himself to the object and
14 the task of rallying public opinion around the plan;
15 and within the army at home, Colonel HASHIMOTO and
16 Captain Chow with whom he wanted to carry out the
17 October push.

18 Q Did he say anything to you as to whether or
19 not the occupation of Manchuria, which followed the
20 night of September 18, was the result of the plan he
21 disclosed to you?

22 A Yes.

23 Q What did he say?

24 A He said that he had long thought about it
25 himself and that he had been collecting data while in

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1 the Research Bureau, and that he felt extremely
2 gratified and fortunate that a similar plan was
3 being prepared and later carried out by the Kwantung
4 Army.

5 Q Did he say whether or not the establishment
6 of the so-called government of Manchukuo was the
7 result of the plan he described to you?

8 A Yes.

9 Q What did he say?

10 A He said that the establishment in Manchukuo
11 progressed smoothly, without a hitch, because of the
12 fact that it had been well planned and prepared
13 beforehand.

14 Q Do you know the accused ITAGAKI?

15 A Yes. I am very much indebted to him.

16 Q When did you first meet him?

17 A He was my section leader in the same
18 company when I entered the military academy.

19 Q Is he in the courtroom today?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Will you indicate to the Court where he is
22 seated?

23 A (Indicating) Extreme right, second row.

24 Q Did you ever serve with him in Manchuria?

25 A Yes.

TANAKA

DIRECT

1 Q When?

2 A March, 1935 to March, 1937.

3 Q Did you ever talk to him prior to September
4 18, 1931 about Manchuria?

5 A Yes.

6 Q When and where was this?

7 A In Port Arthur, when I made a tour of
8 Manchuria in June, 1930.

9 Q At that time, what, if anything, in his
10 conversation with you did he advocate with reference
11 to Manchuria?

12 A With reference to the Manchurian Incident,
13 no, but he did say that Manchuria should be placed
14 under Japanese control by all means.

15 Q Did he say anything on the subject matter
16 of the use of force to accomplish this result?

17 A Yes.

18 Q What did he say?

19 A The situation between China and Japan in
20 Manchuria at that time was extremely aggravated in
21 view of the fact that many pending issues between
22 the two countries, treaty problems and others, had
23 been unsolved. However, after the death of Chang
24 Tso-lin, the relationship between China and Japan
25 became even more seriously aggravated. Furthermore,

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1 he said that the pending questions in Manchuria
2 between the two countries were so serious that their
3 settlement could not be arrived at by diplomatic
4 means and that there was no alternative in solving
5 these problems except the use of armed force; that
6 armed force should be resorted to in Manchuria in
7 order to drive out Chang Hsueh-liang and his regime
8 and, after driving these war lords out, to estab-
9 lish in Manchuria Chinese-Japanese cooperation by
10 literally joining the hands of the two peoples and
11 thereby endeavor to create a model state under the
12 rule of law and order in accordance with the prin-
13 ciples of the kingly way; and, on such a basis, to
14 bring about the healthy economic development of
15 that area.

16 In the first stage, in the political field,
17 Manchuria should be guided under Japanese control.
18 As a result of this program, it was felt that a
19 model area concretely demonstrating the possibility
20 of various races to live together in peace and
21 cooperation will be set up in Asia.

22 If a harmony of races and true cooperation
23 could be realized under Japanese leadership in
24 Manchuria, then the peoples of Asia and other areas
25 would come to trust Japan as a leader of the

TANAKA

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1 Asiatic races and respect Japan as their leader.

2 Furthermore, he was of the opinion that with
3 Japan as a leader of Asia, it would be possible in
4 the not too distant future to free all Asia from
5 white domination and bring about the liberation of
6 Asiatic peoples, and bring about the fulfillment of
7 the ideal of Asia for the Asiatics.

8 Q Did you talk to him on any other occasion
9 prior to the Incident with reference to Manchuria?

10 A With respect to the present subject?

11 Q With respect to Manchuria, prior to the
12 Incident, did you talk to him on any other occasion?

13 A No.

14 Q After the Incident occurred on September
15 18, did you have occasion to talk to General
16 ITAGAKI with reference to what happened on the night
17 of September 18?

18 A With reference to the events of the night
19 of September 18 or with reference to any plan there-
20 to, I heard nothing from him. However, at the time
21 of the Incident I heard that heavy guns set up in
22 Mukden had a very powerful effect.

23 Q Did you talk to General ITAGAKI after the
24 Incident with reference to these guns you mentioned?

25 A Yes. I heard from General ITAGAKI.

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1 Q When and where was it you talked to him
2 with reference to the guns?

3 A If my memory serves me right, in the fall
4 of 1935.

5 Q Were you attached to the Kwantung Army at
6 that time?

7 A Yes. I was Staff Officer, Kwantung Army.

8 Q Was General ITAGAKI attached to the
9 Kwantung Army at that time?

10 A Yes. He was Deputy Chief of Staff, Kwantung
11 Army at that time.

12 Q How often did you see him in those days?

13 A When his Excellency, ITAGAKI, was stationed
14 in Hsinking, I had occasion to see him on official
15 duty daily.

16 Q Will you state what he told you in detail
17 on that occasion with reference to the gun?

18 A Yes.

19 Q What did he say?

20 A In speaking of this gun, the conversation
21 arose to the effect that in a war it was necessary
22 to strike against the enemy's weakness and to over-
23 whelm the enemy. Before the outbreak of the Incident
24 on September 18, 1931 the Chief of the Military
25 Affairs Section in the War Office, NAGATA, Tetsuzan,

1 sent two heavy guns to Manchuria to set up in Mukden;
2 and one of these guns was used in the bombardment of
3 the Mukden airfield when the Incident occurred. The
4 one set up in the north docks was concentrated on
5 the Mukden airfield when the Incident broke out.
6 And the Chinese troops, when they heard the big
7 noise of the guns as well as the rain of shells that
8 came showering down upon them, immediately abandoned
9 Mukden, and the quick Chinese retreat enabled the
10 Japanese to carry out their first operations
11 against Mukden very smoothly.

12 THE MONITOR: And, therefore, he said
13 that element of surprise is very essential in war.
14 Furthermore, two guns of 24 cm. caliber were in-
15 stalled in Mukden. When the Incident occurred one
16 of them shot at the north barracks -- Chinese bar-
17 racks, that is -- and one shot at Mukden airfield.

18 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
19 fifteen minutes.

20 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
21 taken until 1505, after which the proceed-
22 ings were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now
2 resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Sackett.

4 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

5 BY MR. SACKETT:

6 Q General, you were testifying with reference
7 to your conversation with ITAGAKI concerning the in-
8 stallation of certain guns. Did ITAGAKI tell you who
9 suggested the installation of these guns?

10 A It was Colonel NAGATA, Tetsuzan, Chief of
11 the Military Affairs Section, War Office, according
12 to what his Excellency ITAGAKI told me.

13 Q When did he say the guns were installed
14 at Mukden?

15 A The installation was completed on or about
16 10 September.

17 Q What, if anything, did he say as to the
18 installation being kept a secret?

19 A Yes. He said that the installation of the
20 guns should be kept a very, kept a top secret; and that
21 to the outside world it should be said that a well was
22 being dug.

23 Q When you stated the installation of the guns
24 was completed September 10, what year were you referring
25 to?

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1 A 1931.

2 Q What type of garrison was this where the
3 guns were installed?

4 A The garrison of the infantry in Mukden.

5 Q Are you familiar with the terrain around
6 Mukden where the Incident took place on the night of
7 September 18?

8 A Yes.

9 Q You have already testified that you have
10 been especially trained in artillery matters, is
11 that right?

12 A I was an officer in the artillery.

13 Q Do you know the range of the guns that were
14 installed at Mukden according to the accused ITAGAKI?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Will you state what that was in miles?

17 A Maximum range fifteen miles.

18 Q From your knowledge of the location where
19 the guns were installed, are you able to state whether
20 the guns had sufficient range that their fire might
21 reach the particular spot on the South Manchurian Rail-
22 road where the alleged explosion occurred on the night
23 of September 18?

24 A Yes.

25 Q By that you mean they were of sufficient

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1 range?

2 A Yes.

3 Q When you were on the General Staff of the
4 Kwantung Army, did you ever have occasion to talk to
5 the accused ITAGAKI about current Manchurian affairs?

6 A What do you mean by "current affairs?"

7 Q Affairs current at the time you talked to
8 him.

9 A Do you mean at the time I was attached to
10 the Kwantung Army or at the time of the Incident?

11 Q I am referring to the time you were attached
12 to the Kwantung Army.

13 A Yes, I was always speaking of current
14 matters with him because of my official duties at the
15 time.

16 Q And what were the approximate dates that
17 you served together with the accused ITAGAKI in the
18 Kwantung Army?

19 A Approximately two years.

20 Q Will you state those years?

21 A March 1935 to March 1937.

22 Q In your conversations with ITAGAKI during
23 those years, what, if anything, did he advocate with
24 reference to Japan's control of Manchuria?

25 A With respect to domination, no; but he

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1 advocated control.

2 Q Will you explain what you mean by "control"
3 when you say he advocated control?

4 A To realize political conditions in Man-
5 churia in a manner desired by Japan, to develop Man-
6 churia economically in a manner desired by Japan; and
7 to establish close and intimate relationships between
8 Japan and Manchuria with respect to defense; at the
9 same time to promote the happiness and prosperity of
10 the people inhabiting Manchuria.

11 Q To your own personal knowledge, while you
12 were in Manchuria, did ITAGAKI as Chief of Staff of
13 the Kwantung Army exercise any control over Manchuria?

14 A As Senior Staff Officer, no; but through the
15 Chief of Staff as well as the Assistant Chief of Staff
16 of the Kwantung Army it may be said that he was one of
17 the foremost and leading figures in the construction
18 of Manchukuo. Furthermore, he was highly trusted and
19 respected by people in Manchuria and Japan and by
20 virtue of the fact that Japan, -- the Kwantung Army
21 had internal control -- authority-- under the Japan-
22 Manchukuo Treaty, he exercised control over the in-
23 ternal affairs of that state -- he very skillfully
24 controlled the internal affairs of that state.

25 Q Did not the accused ITAGAKI become Chief of

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1 Staff of the Kwantung Army himself?

2 A His Excellency, General ITAGAKI, went to
3 Manchuria as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kwantung
4 Army at the end of 1935; became Chief of Staff in
5 March 1936 and held that post until March 1937.

6 Q Will you describe in your own words how the
7 accused ITAGAKI, while he was Chief of Staff of the
8 Kwantung Army, exercised control over Manchukuo as
9 you have testified?

10 A At the time of the establishment of the
11 State of Manchukuo, his Excellency ITAGAKI returned
12 for a visit to Japan and returned to Manchukuo again
13 in the end of 1935 as Deputy Chief of Staff of the
14 Kwantung Army. At that time he said that the develop-
15 ment of Manchukuo was progressing as intended and
16 desired. Between Japan and Manchuria there was con-
17 cluded a treaty for mutual defense under which the
18 Kwantung Army had authority to control and guide
19 the internal affairs of Manchukuo. By this means
20 an inseparable relationship was established between
21 Japan and Manchuria; and the purpose of this authority
22 to control the internal affairs of Manchuria was cal-
23 culated to promote the happiness of the peoples of
24 both countries. This control over the internal affairs
25 of Manchuria was carried out through the General

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1 Affairs Department of Manchukuo. The all-important
2 personnel shifts and appointments were made by the
3 Director of this General Affairs Department. As to
4 the shifts in personnel, no action actually could be
5 done by the Chief of Staff without the approval of
6 the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

7 MR. SACKETT: I would like to have that
8 retranslated, if the Court please. That cannot be
9 the correct answer.

10 A (Reinterpreted) Correction: Shifts in
11 personnel could not be carried out by the Commander-
12 in-Chief of the Kwantung Army without actually hav-
13 ing the approval of the Chief of Staff.

14 (Further reinterpretation) Shifts in
15 personnel were carried out -- could be carried out
16 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army; but,
17 actually, it could not be carried out by the above-
18 named General Affairs Department without the approval
19 of the Chief of Staff.

20 All important industries, such as the steel
21 and coal industries, were entirely placed under the
22 control of the government. Also placed under government
23 control were railways, communications and fiscal
24 matters. No political parties were permitted with
25 the exception of the Concordia Society. That is all.

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1 Q To your personal knowledge, did General
2 ITAGAKI, as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army
3 exercise any economic control over Manchukuo?

4 A General ITAGAKI was not Commander-in-Chief
5 of the Kwantung Army.

6 Q Well, what I mean is as Chief of Staff
7 of the Kwantung Army.

8 A I understand. In 1926, in order to realize
9 the epical development of Manchukuo, a five-year plan
10 of Manchukuoan development was adopted. At this time
11 HOSHINO, Naoki, became Director General of the General
12 Affairs Department being an expert on fiscal and econom-
13 ic problems. Because of HOSHINO's expert knowledge,
14 the economic aspects of Manchurian development pro-
15 gressed under Japanese control as desired and realized
16 very favorable -- favorable results.

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1 Q My question was to your knowledge did
2 General ITAGAKI personally exercise any economic
3 control over Manchukuo?

4 A I am confident in saying that ITAGAKI had
5 no direct relationship whatsoever with the economic
6 control of Manchukuo.

7 Q What connection did ITAGAKI have with the
8 Manchukuo government while he was Chief of Staff?

9 A As Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army he
10 very closely guided the General Affairs Department of
11 Manchukuo.

12 Q Is that the department you stated was headed
13 by HOSHINO?

14 A Yes, before HOSHINO became Director General
15 and even after he was appointed to that office.

16 Q Did ITAGAKI have anything to do with the
17 appointment of officials in Manchukuo?

18 A Yes. HOSHINO's appointments and dismissals
19 of officials in the Manchukuo government could not
20 be carried out without the approval of ITAGAKI.

21 Q To your knowledge did ITAGAKI exercise
22 any political control over Manchukuo?

23 MR. McMANUS: If the Tribunal please, many
24 of these questions are leading. Cannot the prosecutor
25 here ask the witness what control ITAGAKI had over

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1 Manchukuo. Now he is going into each separate phase.
2 They are all leading questions. I think it is time
3 we should note our objection.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Well, I uphold that objec-
5 tion. I noticed they were leading an hour ago. I
6 think some attempt should be made to observe the
7 rules. We are not bound by them but in the case of
8 a witness like this, who doesn't need any leading, I
9 think it would be just as well to observe the rules.

10 Q Was Manchukuo, during the days you were
11 there with the Kwantung Army, a completely inde-
12 pendent country?

13 A No.

14 Q Describe what you mean by that answer it
15 was not completely independent.

16 A By the Japan-Manchukuo Mutual Defense Pact
17 concluded in December, 1932, it is clear that
18 Manchukuo was placed under Japanese control. By
19 virtue of this pact the Kwantung Army has authority
20 to control the internal affairs of Manchukuo. By
21 virtue of this authority the Kwantung Army through
22 the General Affairs Department of the Manchukuo
23 Government exercised political and economic control
24 as Japan desired for the purpose of promoting the
25 prosperity and happiness of the people of that area.

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1 The important positions in this Department of
2 General Affairs was filled by -- almost entirely
3 by Japanese officials. Hence, it was possible to
4 control Manchukuo as Japan desired. The fundamental
5 factor in the economic and political affairs is
6 personnel. Personnel shifts in Manchukuo were
7 carried out in the name of the Emperor, Kang Te,
8 but this could not be possible without the approval
9 of the Kwantung Army -- most of the important
10 personnel shifts. Inasmuch as the political,
11 economic, and financial affairs of the Manchukuo
12 Government were operated in accordance with Japanese
13 desire with a view to promoting the welfare of the
14 people of Manchuria through the control exercised
15 by the General Affairs Department, which in turn was
16 under the control of the Kwantung Army, which
17 exercised, as I have said before, internal control
18 over its affairs, it can be concluded that the
19 Kwantung Army exercised control over the government
20 of Manchukuo. With respect to national defense, the
21 Military Affairs Department of the Manchukuo Govern-
22 ment had Japanese officers as advisers thereof and
23 through them this department was directly and closely
24 linked up with the Kwantung Army, and by virtue of
25 that relationship the Kwantung Army exercised military

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1 control over that government also. Hence, the
2 Manchukuoan Army moved as desired by the Kwantung
3 Army. That is all.

4 Q You have mentioned a HOSHINO as being
5 president of the General Affairs Bureau of
6 Manchukuo. Is he one of the accused in this case?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Is he here in the courtroom today?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Will you point him out please, sir?

11 A (Pointing) Fourth from the right, first
12 row.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Somewhat formal and even
14 dramatic, but, nevertheless, quite unnecessary.

15 Q Will you state to the Tribunal what the
16 duties were, if you know, of the General Affairs
17 Bureau of Manchukuo?

18 A To direct and guide the political and
19 economic affairs in Manchuria in the interest of
20 Japan as well as the interest of Manchukuo in
21 accordance with the treaties entered into between
22 the two countries.

23 Q You mentioned General TATEKAWA as one
24 of the planners of the Manchurian Incident. Is
25 he living or dead?

A No.

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1 Q Is he living or is he dead? Will you state
2 one or the other, please, sir?

3 A I recall that he died in September last
4 year.

5 Q What was his rank at the time of his death?

6 A Lieutenant General.

7 Q Did you know him?

8 A Yes, very well.

9 Q When did you first meet him?

10 A In 1925 when TATEKAWA, then colonel, was
11 transferred from Commander of the Hiroshima Regiment-
12 to the General Staff Office as Chief of the European-
13 Section.

14 Q Did you ever serve with him in the Japanese
15 Army on other occasions than that?

16 A At that time I was also in the Army General.
17 Staff Office but we were attached to different
18 sections.

19 Q Did you serve with him later?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Will you state when and where?

22 A I was serving under him in Peiping from
23 March, 1928, to August, 1929.

24 Q Did you ever talk to him about Manchuria
25 prior to the Incident?

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1 A Yes.

2 Q What did he say to you with reference to
3 Manchuria?

4 MR. McMANUS: If your Honor please, I
5 realize that hearsay testimony is admissible here.
6 However, it appears to me that conversation with a
7 dead man, to be recorded here, is highly irregular.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Oh, that doesn't make any
9 difference. It is going to be difficult to check
10 conversations with a man who is dead. Nevertheless,
11 the evidence is admissible for our purposes. The
12 objection is overruled.

13 A In 1929, when I was Section Chief -- when I
14 was Chief of the Investigation Section in the
15 General Staff Office, General TATEKAWA was Chief
16 of the Second Division of the Army General Staff.
17 General TATEKAWA at that time told me that under all
18 circumstance Manchukuo -- Manchuria should be placed
19 under Japanese control and that it should be made into
20 a self-sustaining state or self-sufficient state,
21 with the exception of petroleum. Accordingly, General
22 TATEKAWA instructed me to go to Manchukuo for the
23 purpose of investigating this matter. As a result
24 of my investigation, I found that Manchuria could
25 not become in itself a self-sufficient state, and

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1 reported accordingly. However, he said that
2 efforts should be made to make Manchuria a self-
3 contained country with the exception of petroleum,
4 and that every effort should be made to develop
5 resources in order to produce that product. In
6 August, 1929, a conference of chiefs of staff was
7 held and the plan for establishing self-sufficiency
8 in Manchuria was distributed among those who attended
9 the conference. By utilizing this material, effort
10 was made to impress upon them the fact that Manchuria
11 was the life line of Japan.

12 MONITOR: Correction: To impress upon the
13 entire Japanese Army.

14 ESS: (Continuing) Major General
15 TATEKATA had a strong conviction that unless
16 Manchuria were seized by Japan it would be impossible
17 for Japan to become one of the powers of the world
18 as a highly developed national defense state. That
19 is all.

20 Q Did you ever have occasion to talk to him
21 after the events of September 18, 1931?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Will you state when and where that was?

24 A In 1934 when I was lieutenant colonel in
25 the First Mountain Artillery Regiment.

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1 MONITOR: Correction: Heavy field artillery.

2 WITNESS: (Continuing) When I was en route
3 to my native place to pay respects to my ancestors, I
4 met General TATEKAWA in Himeji, where he was division
5 commander, and talked to him at that time about
6 Manchurian problems.

7 Q Will you state in detail just what he told
8 you on that occasion with reference to the events that
9 took place on the night of September 18?

10 A His Excellency TATEKAWA both expected and
11 supported the Manchurian Incident.

12 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, we want
13 to object to the answer as not being responsive to the
14 question and, incidentally, sir, we would like to
15 object to the question as assuming a fact not in
16 evidence. The witness has never testified to any
17 conversation concerning the September 18th Incident.
18 Counsel has consistently, throughout his questioning,
19 assumed facts not in evidence and we ask that the
20 Tribunal ask him not to do that.

21 THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite understand what
22 you mean by assuming facts not in evidence. This man
23 is giving evidence. There is no affidavit.

24 MR. WARREN: Yes, that is right, sir. It
25 is very common in American practice to object on the

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1 ground that counsel is assuming a fact not in evidence.
2 The witness is here and he asked him about a conversa-
3 tion and immediately asked the witness about a portion
4 of a conversation that the witness has never related
5 occurred.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see what you mean.

7 MR. SACKETT: May I explain? I asked a
8 question if he had a conversation with respect to the
9 Manchurian Incident and the next question I asked him
10 to describe events on the night of September 18, which
11 is the same thing.

12 THE PRESIDENT: That is an example of the
13 compound question which we want to avoid.

14 MR. SACKETT: I will straighten it out with
15 another question, if your Honor please.

16 Q General TANAKA, will you state whether or
17 not you talked with TATEKAWA with reference to the
18 events that took place on the night of September 18,
19 1931?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Will you state in detail what that conver-
22 sation was?

23 A General TATEKAWA at that time told me that he
24 was expecting the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident
25 and that the time at last was approaching when Japan

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1 can do what she desires to do with Manchuria. However,
2 on the 12th of September a cable was received from
3 Foreign Minister SHIDAHARA from the Japanese Consul
4 General in Mukden reporting the fact that a company
5 commander of a patrol unit in Fushin had said that
6 within a week a big Incident would break out. Foreign
7 Minister SHIDAHARA brought this matter to the atten-
8 tion of the War Minister MINAMI and strongly protested
9 against the report that he had on hand. As a result,
10 War Minister MINAMI ordered General TATEKAWA to go
11 to Mukden as a special emissary post haste to put a
12 stop to the contemplated action of the Kwantung Army
13 and, in accordance with that order, made a hasty trip
14 to Mukden.

15 MONITOR: Correction: September 12 should
16 be September 15 or 16.

17 WITNESS: (Continuing) He told me, that is,
18 General TATEKAWA told me that General MINAMI, War
19 Minister, had told him to stop the Incident at all
20 costs but that it was his own desire, that is, General
21 TATEKAWA's desire, not to stop it. General TATEKAWA
22 further told me that he had arrived in Mukden in the
23 evening of September 18; that the Kwantung Army,
24 thinking that he had come to stop the Incident had
25 brought him to a restaraunt in Mukden to isolate him.

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1 He further said that he was taken to this restaraunt
2 in Mukden by Major HANAYA, assistant in the Special
3 Service Section of the Army stationed in Mukden, and
4 accompanied this major because he, himself, had no
5 desire to see other people in Mukden. At midnight
6 the roar of heavy artillery so frightened the geisha
7 girls that they began to tremble. General TATEKAWA
8 further said that he had told the Geisha and others
9 employed in the restaraunt not to tremble so much in-
10 as much as he was here in Mukden and that the Kwantung
11 Army also knew that he was there. The General further
12 said that he had slept soundly until the morning until
13 Major HANAYA came to call for him, but at that time
14 the Incident had already occurred and that he was
15 unable to carry out his mission. That is all.

16 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn to half past
17 nine tomorrow morning.

18 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
19 was taken until Saturday, 6 July 1946, at
20 0930.)
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